We present a simple parametric calculus of processes which exchange open mobile code, that is, code which may contain free variables to be bound by the receiver's code. Type safety is ensured by a combination of static and dynamic checks. That is, internal consistency of each process is statically verified, by relying on local type assumptions on missing code; then, when code is sent from a process to another, a runtime check based on a subtyping relation ensures that it can be successfully received, without requiring re-inspection of the code. In order to refuse communication in as few cases as possible, the runtime check accepts even mobile code which would be rejected if statically available, by automatically inserting coercions driven by the subtyping relation, as in the so-called Penn translation. The calculus is parametric in some ingredients which can vary depending on the specific language or system. Notably, we abstract away from the specific nature of the code to be exchanged, and of the static and dynamic checks. We formalize the notion of type safety in our general framework and provide sufficient conditions on the above ingredients which guarantee this property. We illustrate our approach on a simple lambda-calculus with records, where type safe exchange of mobile code is made problematic by conflicts due to components which were not explicitly required. In particular, we show that the standard coercion semantics given in the literature, with other aims, for this calculus, allows to detect and eliminate conflicts due to inner components, thus solving a problem which was left open in previous work on type-safe exchange of mobile code.
Introduction
In a previous paper [8] , we have presented a parametric calculus of processes which exchange mobile code in a type-safe manner. This calculus, built on a simple coordination mechanism with standard send/receive primitives, formalizes in a languageindependent setting the ideas advocated in MoMi [3,4,2]:
• Each process statically checks type safety of its local code, by relying on requirements on missing code, formally expressed by types.
• Mobile code exchanged among processes is equipped with its type, obtained by the previous phase. found in the literature allows to simply and nicely express detection and elimination of conflicts due to arbitrarily nested components, whereas in previous work on type safe exchange of mobile code [4, 8] only top-level conflicts were considered. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first present the untyped version of our calculus in Sect.1, then add static and dynamic checks in Sect.2. We formalize the notion of type safety in our parametric framework and provide sufficient conditions on the ingredients to be provided as arguments which guarantee this property. In Sect.3 we formally define an instantiation which takes a simple lambda-calculus with records as core calculus, and coercions which delete, at any nested level, components which were not explicitly required 6 . Finally, in Sect. 4 we summarize our contribution and briefly discuss related and further work.
The Untyped Calculus
The untyped calculus for exchange of mobile open code is defined in a parametric way on top of a core calculus providing the following ingredients:
• variables x , y, z , . . . ∈ Var;
• (core) expressions e ∈ Exp c , with Var ⊆ Exp c ; a substitution ρ is a mapping from variables into (core) expressions, written x i i∈I → e i , ;
• free variables FV (e) of an expression e;
• application of a substitution ρ to an expression e, written e{ρ};
• (core) reduction relation e c − → e .
The syntax is given in Fig.1 . Since the focus of our framework is on dynamic retrieval and typechecking of open code, we consider a very simple coordination mechanism based on standard synchronous send/receive primitives. In particular, a process can be, besides a process variable, either the null process nil, a parallel composition of processes, a sending or a receiving process. A process send([x i∈I i ]E ).p sends open code E (which can be either core code or in turn a process) with free
.p receives open code, say E , and makes it close by binding free variables in E as specified by the substitution x i i∈I → E i (a mapping from variables into expressions); the resulting code is available in the subsequent process p via x . Note that we keep the language as simple as possible, hence do not consider additional syntactic constructs (e.g., let-in) which could be useful in practice, but are not significant to our aim.
We will use the following notations for mappings (e.g., substitutions): ρ \ x is the map obtained from ρ by removing the association for x (if present); ρ 1 , ρ 2 is the union of substitutions ρ 1 and ρ 2 with disjoint domains. Moreover, we will use the following abbreviations:
• send(E ).p for send([ ]E ).p, that is, when sent code is closed,
• receive(x ).p for receive(x [ ]).p, that is, when received code must be closed,
.p, that is, when a variable in received code is bound to an outer binder in local code (see below).
Reduction semantics of process terms is modeled by a labelled relation p λ − → p where the label is either τ , denoting an internal step, or ![υ]E , ?[υ]E , denoting, respectively, sending and receiving an expression E with free variables υ. An internal step occurs as effect of either a reduction step at the core level, or an exchange of code in a parallel composition of processes (see below).
We denote by λ the complement of λ, defined for λ = τ in the usual way. Moreover, we will use on labels the same abbreviations used for processes and write ?E and !E when υ is empty.
Before giving the formal reduction rules, we illustrate how exchange of mobile code works by some examples.
First of all, consider the following parallel composition:
The left-side process sends open code x + 1, whereas the right-side process is willing to receive code with a free variable x to be locally bound to 2. As a result of synchronization between the two processes, the right-side process replaces y by the code sent by the left-side process, where x has been in turn replaced by 2, hence 2 + 1 is then sent. Formally we have the following reduction sequence:
Note that in the calculus there are three different kinds of binders: in a process
.p, x binds subsequent local code p, whereas the x i∈I i will (re)bind dynamically received code; in a process send([x i∈I i ]E ).p, the x i∈I i bind sent code E , in such a way that free occurrences of x i∈I i are unbound from their local binders, if any. We will call these three kinds of binders local binders, rebinders, and unbinders, respectively. In the process p above, the first occurrence of x is an unbinder, the first occurrence of y is a local binder, and the third occurrence of x is a rebinder.
A local binder can also affect subsequent dynamically received code, when it binds free variables in a rebinding ρ, as shown by the following example:
In this example, note the use of the abbreviation y[x ], which means that free variable x in received code will be bound to a definition which is still to be received as well. This abbreviation formally stands for y[x → x ]. It is also worth noting that, since the process send(y + x ).nil has no unbinders specified, both y and x must be locally replaced before sending the code; compare with the following reduction sequence where x is unbound instead.
The following example illustrates the case where mobile code is in turn a process.
]).send(y + 1).nil ).nil
Finally, the following example shows that a local binder can affect not only dynamically received code but also, in case process code is received, code dynamically received by this code, and so on. Before formally defining the reduction relation, we extend, in Fig.2 , the definitions of free variables and application of a substitution, provided as ingredients at the core level, to mobile code. We denote by ρ c the subset of substitution ρ mapping variables into core expressions. Conditions υ ∩ FV (ρ) = ∅ and x ∈ FV (ρ) avoid unexpected captures of free variables in ρ.
Reduction rules are defined in Fig.3 . Rules (core-send) and (core-rcv) allow reduction at the core level. Note that core code can be either sent or further reduced in a non deterministic way, and analogously for core code in a rebinding. This means that we do not care about where core mobile code is executed, either by the sender or the receiver, even though this will of course make a difference in practice, e.g., in case of non termination. Sending a process term, instead, intuitively means sending coordination code to be executed by the receiver.
In rule (send), mobile code can be sent only if it does not contain free variables apart from those specified by the unbinders. That is, unbinders are used by the programmer to specify whether a variable has to be bound locally or remotely, as 
We prove the above proposition as a case of the following, which takes into account communication steps with the outside world. Intuitively, when receiving code E , no unbound variables are introduced only if E has no more free variables than those it declares. Conversely, code sent to the external world has no more free variables than those it declares (this is inductively used to prove the property on internal steps).
Proposition 1.2 Under Assumption 1:
• If p
Proof. By induction on reduction rules. We show the most interesting cases: − −− → p{x → E {ρ}}, with υ ⊆ dom(ρ). Since, by hypothesis, FV (E ) ⊆ υ, we have FV (E ) ⊆ dom(ρ); hence, FV (E {ρ}) ⊆ FV (ρ) and the thesis trivially follows.
2
We conclude this section with two slight variants, expressed in our framework, of examples presented in [6] (Fig. 5) to show rebinding scenarios in distributed systems. We assume the core calculus to include expressions of string, unit and functional types (we write some type annotations as an help to the reader, but types are not relevant here), and we enrich the process syntax with the construct let ρ in p, with the usual semantics.
Let us consider the process let print : string → unit → . . . in (p 1 p 2 ), where: 
!print "site 2":unit − −−−−−−−−−− → Hence, in the left-hand side process, variable here is first sent to be printed with its local definition, i.e. ,"site 1", then is sent and rebound at a remote site to the label "site 2".
Let us now consider a variant of the process above, able to perform a customized linking. This is obtained by changing the definition of p 2 in the following way:
.nil where e = if trusted() then "site 2" else "site 33". Here, p 2 has two possible rebindings for the variable here: the real site name "site 2" for trusted programs and the fake name "site 33" for untrusted ones. Which rebinding to perform is determined by the hypothetical function trusted, which takes into account some security criteria, such as the origin of the message.
It is worth to note that in our framework the rebinding is obtained without any need of a lazy semantics for the substitution, as instead happens in [6] , where a delayed instantiation is required.
The Typed Calculus
To define the typed calculus, we need the following additional core ingredients:
• (core) types t ∈ Type c ,
• (core) type judgment Γ c e : t, where Γ is a type context, that is, a mapping from variables into (core) types, written x i : t i∈I i , • static subtyping relation t ≤ s t, required to be a preorder.
• dynamic subtyping relation t ≤ d t T , where T is a partial mapping, called coercion,
Dynamic subtyping is expected to accept more terms than static subtyping, and coercion consequently adapts the received code to the local context; indeed, mobile code exchange requires, besides dynamic checks guaranteeing type safety, also the ability of the system to dynamically modify code.
Intuitively, we expect static and dynamic subtyping to satisfy a number of properties, such as:
T , then coercion T transforms expressions of (a static subtype of) type t to expressions of (a static subtype of) type t, and is undefined on other expressions;
T , the pair t , t uniquely determines T ,
• ≤ d is a preorder as well,
• t ≤ d t id (the identity mapping),
• ≤ s is a subset of ≤ d , and t ≤ d t id whenever t ≤ s t .
However, we do not formally assume here any of the above properties, since they are not necessary for our main result, that is, type safety (Theorem 2.4), which can be proved under somewhat weaker assumptions, see Assumption 3 and Assumption 5. We leave to further work the investigation of other significant requirements the framework should satisfy which will likely explicitly require some, if not all, of the assumptions as above.
As mentioned in the Introduction, coercions driven by a subtyping relation are also used, mainly with performance reasons, for compiling source code with subtyping in lower-level code without subtyping, see Sect.15.6 of [13] . In this context, the translation which inserts coercions is often called the Penn translation [7] . Apart from the different context and aims, our presentation here differs for some other reasons.
First, our technical treatment is lighter, since, following the style of recent work where type-checking is generalized to compilation, as, e.g., [1] , we pack relation between types and coercion in a unique "compilation" judgment, which we expect to be inductively defined in instantiations of the framework, as, for instance, we do in Sect,3. In [13] , on the contrary, the translation is modeled as a function which takes derivations of subtyping judgments as arguments. Another drastic simplification is that we need to insert coercions only in a single situation, that is, when received code is incorporated with local code, whereas in the original Penn translation coercions must be inserted in a term everywhere there is a subterm of a certain type which appears in a context of a supertype. The technical counterpart of this simplification is that our coercion function can take just terms as arguments, instead of requiring to keep the typing judgment of the term as in [7] .
Second, and more interestingly, since we handle open terms, subtyping is naturally extended to contexts and coercions are inserted in both directions. We believe this is a nice and important generalization of the coercions-driven-by-subtyping approach.
Finally, whereas the original approach is purely syntactic, that is, coercions are expressed as terms of the lower-level language (e.g., λ-abstractions), here, since our aim is to define an abstract framework where core language is not fixed, we take an extensional approach, where coercions are modeled as functions from terms into terms. The fact that coercions could be internalized in the language or not will then depend on the specific instantiation of the framework: for instance, in the following section we will present an instantiation on a simple λ-calculus with records where coercions are expressed by λ-abstractions as in the original approach.
The syntax of the typed calculus is in Fig.4 . The main novelty w.r.t. the untyped version is that mobile code is annotated with a type context Γ (mapping variables into types) and a type T . Types are either core types or the process type . As well-formedness condition, in send and labels we assume υ = dom(Γ), and in receive we assume dom(ρ) = dom(Γ). Hence, υ is redundant, but we keep it for uniformity with the untyped version. We will use the following additional notations for mappings (e.g., type contexts): dom(Γ) is the domain of Γ; Γ[x:T ] is the mapping obtained by updating Γ with the association from x to T .
In Fig.5 , we extend subtyping relations to the process type and to type contexts. The process type is in relation only with itself and the corresponding coercion is the identity. Subtyping relations on type contexts are defined in the natural pointwise way and the associated coercion transforms substitutions of the subtype context into substitutions of the supertype context (substitutions have contexts as types, see rule (t-subst) in Fig.7) .
Reduction rules for the extended calculus are in Fig.6 . They are a straightforward extension to annotated mobile code of those seen for the untyped calculus, except for (rcv), which is the key rule illustrating our approach. The side condition expresses the fact that incoming code E can be retrieved only if its type information Γ , T is compliant with that specified by the receiver Γ, T , as formally specified by the subtyping relation. In this case, appropriate coercions are inserted before combining E with local code, to bridge the gap between provided and required type information. 8 
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send(Γ [υ]E : T ).p !Γ [υ]E :T − −−−−−− → p FV (E ) ⊆ dom(Γ) (core-rcv) e c − → e receive(Γ x [ρ, y → e] : T ).p τ − → receive(Γ x [ρ, y → e ] : T ).p (rcv) receive(Γ x [ρ] : T ).p ?Γ [υ]E :T − −−−−−−− → p{x → T (E {T (ρ)})} T ≤ d T T Γ ≤ d Γ T (par-left) p 1 λ − → p 1 p 1 p 2 λ − → p 1 p 2 (par-right) p 2 λ − → p 2 p 1 p 2 λ − → p 1 p 2 (sync) p 1 λ − → p 1 p 2 λ − → p 2 p 1 p 2 τ − → p 1 p 2
Fig. 6. Typed calculus: reduction rules
(t-subst)
Γ nil :
(t-send) More precisely, all variables explicitly declared as free in the incoming code are rebound to local definitions via coercion from the provided type context Γ to the expected type context Γ ; then, the resulting (now closed since FV (E ) ⊆ υ = dom(Γ ) and dom(Γ ) ⊆ dom(Γ)) expression is substituted in local code via coercion from the declared type T to the required type T .
Typing rules, given in Fig.7 , are straightforward. In rule (t-core), we denote by Γ c the subset of a context Γ which maps core variables into core types. Rule (t-send) allows sending of code which has a static subtype of that it declares, and conversely rule (t-rcv) allows the rebinding to have a static subtype of that declared. Recall also that by well-formedness conditions we have dom(Γ 2 ) = υ in rule (t-send) and dom(Γ 2 ) = dom(ρ) in rule (t-rcv).
We illustrate now how dynamic subtyping and coercion work by an example, where we consider the instantiation of the framework which will be formally detailed in the following sections. That is, we assume that expressions of the core calculus include numbers and records with a sum (concatenation) operator denoted by + and standard record types. Consider the process: We ensure type safe exchange of mobile code by a runtime check analogous to that considered in [4] for mixin classes, to solve the classical problem of interference in record/object types. That is, dynamic subtyping corresponds to standard width subtyping on record types, together with a coercion function which removes additional fields 9 . Then, the type declared by mobile code is a subtype of the expected type, hence communication can take place. Mobile code is adapted to the local code by the following steps. First, y is replaced in the received code via coercion from posint to int, which is the identity, obtaining {X : 0, Y : 1, Z : 2}. Then, x is replaced in the local code via coercion from {X : int, Y : int, Z : int} to {X : int, Y : int}, obtaining a safe record extension in send({X : 0, Y : 1} + {Z : 3}).nil.
The combination of the static type system and the dynamic checks should ensure type safety, that is, that internal steps can never lead to ill-formed process terms (for steps of communication with the "external world" this requires to be confident on the fact that received code complies with its accompanying type information, see below). 10 Definition 2.1 (Type Safety) Exchange of mobile code is type safe if the following (SR) property holds:
We list now a number of assumptions the core calculus should satisfy in order to have type safety. They are mostly standard properties, plus Assumption 5, which states that, whenever the dynamic check on core mobile code succeeds (that is, its declared type is in the dynamic subtyping relation with the required type), this code can be safely incorporated with local code via the corresponding coercion function. T , then Γ c e{x → T (e )} : t , for some t ≤ s t.
Here t x is the required type, t x the type declared by the mobile code and t x its actual type. We now give some useful lemmas.
Lemma 2.2 (Weakening) If Assumption 3 holds, then if Γ E : T and Γ
Proof. By induction on typing rules. We show the most interesting cases.
( t-var-proc) We have that Γ[x:T x ] y : and (Γ[x:T x ]) (y) = , and thus either x = y, hence T x = T x = T x = , E is a process p , ≤ d id, y{y → id(p )} = p and Γ p : holds by hypothesis, or x = y, and thus y{x → T (E )} = y, Γ(y) = , and Γ y : holds by applying typing rule ( t-var-proc).
( t-nil) Trivial.
. By applying the inductive hypothesis to (3), we get Γ p{x → T (E )} : (4). There are two cases to be considered. If x ∈ dom(Γ 2 ), we can conclude by applying the typing rule ( t-send) to (1) and (4) . Otherwise, for definition of substitution, dom(Γ 2 ) ∩ FV (E ) = ∅, hence, by applying Lemma 2.2 to the hypothesis Γ E : T x , we get Γ[Γ 2 ] E : T x . We can now apply the inductive hypothesis to (2) obtaining
E {x → T (E )} : T (5), for some T ≤ s T . Then, since ≤ s is a preorder, we have T ≤ s T and we get the thesis by applying typing rule ( t-send) to (4) and (5).
( t-core) We have that Γ[x:T x ] e : t. Moreover, if T x = then Γ core c e : t, hence, by Assumption 2, we have e{x → T (E )} = e and the thesis follows by applying rule ( t-core). Otherwise, T x is a core type t x , hence Γ core [x:t x ] c e : t. Then, T x must be a core type t x as well, t x ≤ d t x
T and E a core expression e , and by Assumption 5 we get Γ core c e{x → T (e )} : t , for some t ≤ s t. Hence, we get the thesis by applying typing rule ( t-core). . We apply the inductive hypothesis to all y ∈ dom(ρ) in (3) obtaining Γ ρ{x → T (E )} : Γ (4) for some Γ ≤ s Γ. Hence, since ≤ s is a preorder, Γ ≤ s Γ 2 . There are two cases to be considered. If x = y, then the thesis follows by applying typing rule ( t-rcv) to (2) and (4) . Otherwise, for definition of substitution we know that y ∈ FV (E ), hence, by applying Lemma 2.2 to the hypothesis Γ E : T x , we get Γ[y:T ] E : T x (5). We can now apply the inductive hypothesis to (2) and (5) obtaining Γ[y:T ] p{x → T (E )} : (6), and conclude by applying typing rule ( t-rcv) to (4) and (6). We prove type safety as a case of the following generalized type safety which takes into account communication steps with the outside world. Intuitively, when receiving code E , safety is guaranteed only if E actually complies its accompanying type information Γ, T . We assume here to trust this type information to be correct: a more sophisticated approach would require a proof, as in [12] . Conversely, we can prove that code sent to the external world always complies the declared type information (this is inductively used to prove safety of internal steps).
Proposition 2.5 Under assumption 5:
• If Γ p : and p τ − → p , then Γ p : .
• If Γ 1 p : and p
Proof. By induction on reduction rules. We show the most interesting cases.
( core) We have that send(Γ 2 [υ]e : t ).p
− → e , and, since we must have applied typing rules ( t-send) and ( t-core), Γ 1 send(Γ 2 [υ]e : t ).p : ,
core c e : t , t ≤ s t, dom(Γ 2 ) = υ and Γ 1 p : . Since SR holds for the core calculus (Assumption 4), we get that
core c e : t , with t ≤ s t , and, since ≤ s is a preorder, t ≤ s t. Hence by applying typing rules ( t-core) and ( t-send) the thesis follows.
[υ]E : T ).p : . To derive this last judgment, we must have applied typing rule ( t-send), hence Γ 1 p : and
( rcv) We have that
, with T ≤ s T (4). To derive (2), we must have applied typing rule ( t-rcv), hence Γ 1 [x:T ] p : (5), Γ 1 ρ : Γ, Γ ≤ s Γ 2 (6) and dom(ρ) = dom(Γ 2 ) (7). We can apply Lemma 2.3 to (3) and all y in (6) (note that dom(ρ) = dom(Γ 2 ) ⊆ dom(Γ 2 ) from (1) and (7)), with Γ 2 (y) ≤ d Γ 2 (y) (from (1)), obtaining Γ 1 E {T (ρ)} : T (8), with T ≤ s T (9). Since ≤ s is a preorder, from (9) and (4) we get T ≤ s T (10). We can now conclude by applying Lemma 2.3 to (5) and (8) , with (1) and (10) . 2 3 A case study: lambda calculus with records A case-study in exchange of mobile code which has been extensively studied [4, 3, 2, 8] is when code to be exchanged has a record-based structure (records, objects, classes, mixins), and type safety is made problematic by conflicts due to components which were not explicitly required. hides unexpected components to receiver's code. In [8] , we have formalized this kind of solution (on mixin modules rather than classes) as one instantiation of our parametric framework for type safe exchange of mobile code. However, in this previous work only top-level conflicts were detected and avoided, whereas at nested levels width subtyping was simply not allowed. For instance, given as expected type {X: {Y : int}}, the type {X: {Y : int} ,Z : int} was accepted (and Z removed), while {X: {Y : int,Z : int}} was rejected.
In this section, we show that a runtime check based on the Penn translation found in the literature allows for simple and nice detection and elimination of conflicts due to arbitrarily nested components. For simplicity, we illustrate the approach on the more foundational example of records, but the same technique could be easily adapted to objects, classes or mixins: in these cases, to take into account mutual recursion, additional fields must be hidden rather than just removed, see [8] for details.
Formally, we present an instantiation of the framework introduced in the previous sections which takes as core calculus a simple λ-calculus with records, as static subtyping depth subtyping, and as dynamic subtyping depth/width subtyping with a coercion function which removes additional fields. We call the instantiation MoRec del (for "MObile RECords where unexpected fields are DELeted").
The syntax of the core calculus is given in Fig.8 . We assume, besides variables, an infinite set Field of field names. Terms of the calculus are built by (unspecified) operators of basic types, standard operators of lambda calculus, and records with three operators: sum, delete and selection. A record is a map from field names to expressions.
The reduction relation is given in Fig.9 , where we omit standard contextual closure.
Reduction rules are straightforward: rule (app) is standard application (we are not interested in fixing an evaluation strategy here), rule (sel) allows selection of an existing field, rule (sum) performs the union of two records if their sets of field names Besides the already mentioned work, an important source of inspirationfor the idea of coercion driven by a subtyping relation has been [11] .
We plan to investigate other properties besides type safety. For instance, we would like to formalize notions like how often code is rejected and whether the original language semantics is preserved.
